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Overview
Networks and Forensics
Forensic Value of Network Information:
Devices are (invariably) connected to network(s)
Users, applications, and operating systems interconnect (both
explicitly and in the background)
Network activity is invaluable forensic information:








Not looking at network traffic on the wire
Not looking at logs (IDS/Firewall/Anomaly detector, etc)
Instead – a storage-centric view
Post-facto residual network data
Are low-level binary network data structures persisted to non-volatile
storage?
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Overview Hypothesis
Network Carving
In this work, we ask:
Are low-level binary network data structures persisted to non-volatile
storage?
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Network Carving
In this work, we ask:




u_int ip_v:4, /* version */
ip_hl:4; /* header length */
u_char ip_tos; /* type of service */
u_short ip_len; /* total length */
u_short ip_id; /* identification */
u_short ip_off; /* fragment offset field */
u_char ip_ttl; /* time to live */
u_char ip_p; /* protocol */
u_short ip_sum; /* checksum */
struct in_addr ip_src,ip_dst; /* source and dest address */
}
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Surprisingly, yes!
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Background
Prior Work
Network Carving Prior Work:
Network data in ASCII form, e.g. web cache, cookies, etc.
Fully-qualified Domain Names, e.g. www.cnn.com
E-Mail Domain Names, e.g. rob@nps.edu
“Dotted Quads,” e.g. 157.166.224.26
Volatility [Walters]
Volatility memory analysis framework “connscan2” closest in
spirit to our effort
Carves memory dumps and intact Windows hibernation files for
Windows TCP connection structures










Opportunistic hibernation decompression, including fragments
Filtering and Validation techniques
Working implementation in the bulk_extractor
(http://afflib.org/) tool
Evaluation on ground-truth and large (1800 drive) corpus
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Methodology Developing Carving Signatures
Ground Truth
Ground-Truth Corpus:
In order to find binary network carving structure signatures, we
carefully create a ground-truth corpus
Experimented with: Windows, OSX, Linux
Wipe drive with DBAN to ensure no residual data
From a virgin OS install, we establish several HTTP and SCP
connections to known destination IPs
Image the host’s disk after each connection
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Methodology Developing Carving Signatures
Finding Signatures
Finding Signatures:
A binary IPv4 address is simply an unsigned 32-bit integer
To find network addresses, we find discriminatory surrounding
context
Determine if there exist common predecessor/successor patterns
surrounding instances of the known IP
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Methodology Developing Carving Signatures
Frequency Analysis
Finding Signatures
Tempting to use intuitive heuristics:
“a four byte IP address is preceded by a variable fragment field and
a protocol field equal to six.”
But heuristics brittle, difficult to define, and inaccurate
Instead:
Search for IP address
Collect (within 20 Bytes offset) preceding and surrounding
N-grams
Where a “gram” is simply a byte
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Methodology Developing Carving Signatures
Frequency Analysis
IPv4 2-Gram Analysis
Predecessor Freq Successor Freq
Count 2-gram Count 2-gram
434 0x4000 428 0x0016
421 0x0800 426 0x0447
368 0xF202 412 0x0A79
368 0x4006 374 0xAC14
368 0x4508 374 0x694A
368 0x0017 41 0x0000
66 0x4500 12 0x2000
. . . . . . . . . . . .
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Predecessor Freq Successor Freq
Count 2-gram Count 2-gram
434 0x4000 428 0x0016
421 0x0800 426 0x0447
368 0xF202 412 0x0A79
368 0x4006 374 0xAC14
368 0x4508 374 0x694A
368 0x0017 41 0x0000
66 0x4500 12 0x2000
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Decoding:
0x4000: IP Flags=Don’t Fragment
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Methodology Developing Carving Signatures
Frequency Analysis
IPv4 2-Gram Analysis
Predecessor Freq Successor Freq
Count 2-gram Count 2-gram
434 0x4000 428 0x0016
421 0x0800 426 0x0447
368 0xF202 412 0x0A79
368 0x4006 374 0xAC14
368 0x4508 374 0x694A
368 0x0017 41 0x0000
66 0x4500 12 0x2000
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Decoding:
Manual inspection on N-Gram
frequency leads to robust signatures
0x4508/0x4500: IPv4, w/ & w/o
ToS
0x4006: IP TTL=64, Proto=TCP
While TTL=64 is common here,
doesn’t generalize
. . .
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Methodology Signatures
Carving Signatures
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Discovered Ethernet Address
Discovered Ethernet Address
Note: False positives possible, particularly with long strings of
zeros; see paper for theoretical false positive analysis
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Methodology Hibernation
Hibernation Decompression
Why Focus on Hibernation
Network data structures in system memory
Persist to hibernation
Windows overwrites beginning of hibernation files when resuming
Prevents existing systems from analyzing hibernation
We find an 8-byte XPress compression signature within
compressed memory page header
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Methodology Hibernation
Hibernation Decompression
Opportunistically decompress XPress pages





. . . . . . . . .
Improves recall by an order of magnitude on our test image!
R. Beverly, S. Garfinkel, G. Cardwell (NPS) Network Carving DFRWS 2011 18 / 28
Methodology Validation
Validation
To Mitigate False Positives:
Checksum: Self-validate using IP checksum. Not always feasible
due to checksum offloading. 82% of IPs in ground-truth have valid
checksums.
Filtering: Eliminate bogus IP addresses not appearing in the BGP
routing table, e.g. 127.0.0.0/8 and 240.0.0.0/4.
Frequency: Compute histograms of discovered IPs to determine
most likely addresses.
Correlation: We examine if discovered binary IPs correspond to
e.g. ASCII addresses
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Results
Comparisons to State-of-the-Art
Given our carving signatures and methodology:
Compare to Volatility
Analyze ∼ 1,800 images in Real Data Corpus




Fresh Windows XP install
Large transfer, then hibernation
We find the true source and destination IPs with high confidence
as most frequent
Volatility connscan2 finds nothing
NIST CFReDS memory images, labeled with ground-truth
We discover IP of connection to w3.org
Volatility connscan2 finds nothing
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Results
Against Real Data Corpus
Real Data Corpus
RDC: 1,817 images (including cameras, computers, mp3 players,
etc)
Discover IP addresses on 40% of images
Note, binary carving permits checksum validation ==
high-confidence IPs!
How many addresses are “real?”
We don’t have ground-truth
Perform ASCII-based IP carving, correlate
Good correlation between carving modalities for ∼ 20% of the
images
On 66 drives, we find validated IPs not found in ASCII form
See paper for full analysis
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Results
RDC IP addresses
In RDC, where are IP addresses found?
10% in hiberfil.sys
2% in WIN386.SWP
58% in unallocated regions of disk!
Suggests that valuable information in ephemeral stores needs to
be carved by examining physical disk
Geolocation
Lots of private (RFC1918) addresses
Limited success; see paper




Many RDC images bought in batches
We find 16 Ethernet common between images!











































Examine other network structs: IPv6, 802.11, 802.15, 802.16, etc.
Examine available application layer information
Currently applying techniques to mobile smartphone images
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Conclusions
Summary
Demonstrated forensic value of binary network structures via
controlled and real-world experiments
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